Humphreys v. DEA by unknown
1996 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
9-17-1996 
Humphreys v. DEA 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996 
Recommended Citation 
"Humphreys v. DEA" (1996). 1996 Decisions. 75. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1996/75 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1996 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
                 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
                     FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
                                                     
                                 
                          NO. 96-3099 
                                                     
                                 
                    EARL A. HUMPHREYS, M.D., 
                           Petitioner 
                                 
                               v. 
                                 
                DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION, 
                           Respondent. 
                                 
                                                     
                                 
On Appeal from an Order of the Drug Enforcement Administration dated 
January 23, 1996 
                           (AH 16752) 
                                                     
                                 
                      Argued July 26, 1996 
                                 
                                 
BEFORE:  BECKER, STAPLETON, AND MICHEL, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Opinion Filed September 17, 1996) 
 
 
                             Robert A. Felkay, Esquire (argued) 
                             John A. Tumolo, Esquire  
                             Professional Office Building 
                             430 Blvd. Of The Allies 
                             Pittsburgh, PA 15219 
                             Attorney for Earl A. Humphreys, M.D. 
                              
                             John C. Keeney, Esquire,  
                             Theresa M.B. Van Vliet, Esquire,  
                             Hope P. McGowan, Esquire (argued)   
                             Narcotic and Dangerous Drug Section 
                             Criminal Division 
                             Post Office Box 27312 
                             Washington, D.C. 20038 
                             Attorneys for Drug Enforcement Administration 
                                 
                                                     
                                 
                      OPINION OF THE COURT 
                                                     
 
MICHEL, Circuit Judge. 
          
         Earl A. Humphreys, M.D. ("Humphreys") appeals from an order of 
the Drug Enforcement 
Administration ("DEA"), dated January 23, 1996, in which the Deputy 
Administrator of the DEA ordered that 
Humphreys' DEA certificate of registration be revoked and any pending 
application for renewal of the registration 
be denied.  Earl A. Humphreys, M.D.; Revocation of Registration, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 2840 (1996).  Because the DEA 
abused its discretion in failing to consider Humphreys' privacy defense 
and, on the present record, arbitrarily 
revoked his registration, we vacate and remand.  
                            BACKGROUND 
         Humphreys is a Pittsburgh doctor specializing in gastroenterology 
and internal medicine and who, prior 
to this proceeding, had practiced for over 35 years without any 
disciplinary actions being taken against him.  On 
April 12, 1995, a Deputy Assistant Administrator of the DEA issued to 
Humphreys an Order to Show Cause why 
the DEA should not revoke Humphreys' certificate of registration under 21 
U.S.C. § 824(a)(4) and deny any 
pending application under 21 U.S.C. § 823(f) as being inconsistent with 
the public interest.  Specifically, the 
Order to Show Cause alleged that "from the early 1980s to mid-1993, 
[Humphreys] prescribed controlled 
substances to at least four individuals without a legitimate medical need 
and with knowledge that these individuals 
were not the ultimate recipients of the controlled substances." 
          The DEA's action was precipitated by Humphreys' personal and 
professional relationship with former 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice Rolf Larson ("Larson") and the criminal 
investigation of Larson.  
Humphreys acted as Justice Larson's personal physician for approximately 
the past 20 years.  In 1993, based on 
the findings and recommendations of a grand jury, Larson was charged with 
one count of conspiracy to commit 
"Acquisition or Obtaining of Possession of a Controlled Substance by 
Misrepresentation, Fraud, Forgery, 
Deception, or Subterfuge" and numerous other violations of law.  Humphreys 
was named as an unindicted co- 
conspirator in the conspiracy count and received immunity in return for 
his testimony against Larson. 
         The criminal conspiracy charge against Larson, and DEA's 
regulatory investigation of Humphreys, 
stemmed from Larson's attempts to keep his mental health problems out of 
public sight. Beginning in the 1960's, 
Larson visited psychiatrists and psychologists for the treatment of 
clinical depression and anxiety.  These doctors 
prescribed various tranquilizers and antidepressants, which Larson paid 
for out of his own pocket in order to 
preserve his privacy.  Beginning in 1981, however, Larson revised his 
method of assuring his privacy:  he asked 
Humphreys to prescribe various controlled drugs for Larson in the name of 
certain of Larson's employees 
(secretaries and a law clerk).  From the early 1980's to mid-1993, 
Humphreys wrote approximately 34 
prescriptions for drugs in this manner, including prescriptions for 
Valium, Diazepan, Ativan, and Serax. It is 
undisputed that the individuals named on the prescriptions always gave the 
prescription drugs to Larson and did 
not take the medications themselves or resell them.  It is also undisputed 
that Humphreys was aware of Larson's 
diagnosed condition, that he believed each medication he prescribed was 
for an appropriate medical purpose, and 
that he prescribed the substances in appropriate medical dosage amounts 
and at acceptable time intervals.  
Moreover, although Humphreys did not examine Larson each time he 
prescribed drugs, Humphreys did examine 
Larson before the first prescription and approximately every six months 
thereafter. Although Humphreys was 
aware that Larson was continuing to see other doctors, Humphreys was not 
aware of any other medications 
prescribed by Larson's other doctors and did not attempt to coordinate his 
prescriptions with those of these other 
doctors.  Humphreys received no money for writing these prescriptions. 
         After receiving the Order to Show Cause, Humphreys and his 
attorney each filed a response to the 
Order.  Humphreys' primary defense was that, by prescribing the medication 
in the names of Larson's close 
associates, he was attempting to protect Larson's privacy in a manner 
common and acceptable in standard medical 
practice for famous patients with mental conditions.  Humphreys  
waived his right to a hearing, as he was recovering from a stroke.   
         On January 23, 1996, the Deputy Administrator entered his Final 
Order, based on the investigative 
record and Humphreys' written statement.  The Deputy Administrator 
acknowledged that he could revoke 
Humphreys' registration only if continued registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest pursuant to 
the five factors set forth in 21 U.S.C. § 823(f).  The Deputy 
Administrator considered, discussed and relied upon 
each of the five factors except for factor three – Humphreys' conviction 
record under Federal or State laws 
relating to controlled substances, which, because he had none, was not a 
relevant factor – and, based upon these 
factors, determined that the public interest would be best served by 
revoking Humphreys' registration. The 
Deputy Administrator did not discuss, and apparently did not consider, 
Humphreys' privacy defense. Humphreys 
appealed, and this court granted a stay of the Order pending our 
disposition of this appeal.  We have jurisdiction 
to hear this appeal under 21 U.S.C. § 877 (1994).  
                            ANALYSIS 
The Standard of Review 
         Agency decisions, such as the Deputy Administrator's Order, may 
be set aside only if arbitrary, 
capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with the 
law.  5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1994). "As 
a reviewing court, we must accord proper deference to the DEA's expertise 
but must nonetheless make a 
'searching and careful inquiry' of the record to determine whether the 
agency's decision was based on a 
consideration of the relevant factors and whether there was a clear error 
of judgment."  Trawick v. DEA, 861 
F.2d 72, 76 (4th Cir. 1988) (affirming revocation of registration) 
(citation omitted).  
The Regulatory Framework 
         The Controlled Substances Act, as amended by the Dangerous Drug 
Diversion Control Act of 1984, Pub. 
L. No. 98-473, Title II, § 511, 98 Stat. 2073, requires that any person 
who dispenses controlled substances must 
first obtain a certificate of registration from the Attorney General.  21 
U.S.C. §§ 822(a), 823(f) (1994).  The 
Attorney General has delegated the authority to deny, revoke or suspend 
registrations to the Administrator of the 
DEA.  21 U.S.C. § 824 (1994); 28 C.F.R. § 0.100(b). 
     Prior to 1984, the DEA could revoke a registration for only three 
reasons:  (1) falsification of an 
application; (2) felony conviction related to controlled substances; and 
(3) suspension, revocation or denial of a 
state license.  In 1984, with the enactment of the Dangerous Drug 
Diversion Control Act, Congress added a 
fourth reason for which a registration could be revoked, namely, a finding 
that the physician had committed "such 
acts as would render his registration under section 823 of this title 
inconsistent with the public interest as 
determined under such section . . . ." 21 U.S.C. § 824(a) (1994).  In 
determining whether registration would be 
inconsistent with the public interest, the DEA must consider the following 
factors:  
               (1)  The recommendation of the appropriate State licensing 
board or 
          disciplinary authority. 
               (2)  The applicant's experience in dispensing, or 
conducting research 
          with respect to controlled substances. 
               (3)  The applicant's conviction record under Federal or 
State laws 
          relating to the manufacture, distribution, or dispensing of 
controlled 
          substances.  
               (4)  Compliance with applicable State, Federal, or local 
laws relating 
          to controlled substances. 
               (5)  Such other conduct which may threaten the public 
health and 
          safety. 
 
21 U.S.C. § 823(f) (1994). The five factors are independent, and the 
Deputy Administrator may revoke a 
registration based on one factor or a combination of several factors.  
Henry J. Schwartz, M.D., 54 Fed. Reg. 
16,422, 16,424 (1989). 
     The DEA bears the burden of proving that registration would not be in 
the public interest.  See Shatz v. 
United States Dep't of Justice, 873 F.2d 1089, 1091 (8th Cir. 1989) ("We 
think the burden of persuasion and 
production on the issue whether registration would be in the public 
interest was correctly placed on the 
Administrator as an initial matter.  Once the Administrator produced 
evidence of the state medical board's 
actions, the DEA investigation and the drug-related felony conviction, the 
burden of production only then shifted 
to Shatz to rebut this evidence."). 
Applicability of the Statute to Humphreys and its Application 
     Humphreys raises two primary issues on appeal:  whether 21 U.S.C. § 
824(a) can apply to the facts of 
this case and, if so, whether the DEA properly applied the five public 
interest factors to his case and properly 
considered his privacy defense.   
     Initially, we may easily dispose of Humphreys' contention that 21 
U.S.C. § 824(a) was never meant to 
apply to physicians in his circumstances.  Citing Trawick, 861 F.2d at 76, 
Humphreys argues that the legislative 
history of the 1984 amendment indicates it was meant to apply only in 
egregious cases and was specifically 
directed to those physicians who prescribed controlled substances to 
addicts, who then could either use the drugs 
themselves or resell them in order to purchase different drugs, such as 
heroin. Humphreys argues that his actions 
did not fall within the category of egregious cases.  Certainly, there is 
no allegation here of sales to addicts. 
     However, Humphreys, while relying on selected language in the Trawick 
opinion, has ignored not only 
the holding of the Trawick decision, but other language as well.  In 
Trawick, a dentist was indicted on state felony 
drug charges, including conspiracy to distribute and distribution of 
cocaine, based on acts not related to his 
patients.  861 F.2d at 73-74.  The dentist pled guilty only to misdemeanor 
possession of cocaine as part of a plea 
bargain.  Id. at 74.  Following his conviction, the DEA revoked his 
registration as being inconsistent with the 
public interest. Id. The Court of Appeals noted that the legislative 
history of the public interest standard was much 
as Humphreys now suggests, but concluded that the dentist there could not 
"avoid the plain statutory language of 
the amendment merely by showing that Congress, in enacting it was largely 
concerned with a situation different 
from the instant case."  Id. at 76.  Reasoning that a court must uphold 
any reasonable agency construction of a 
statute it is entrusted to enforce, the court concluded it was reasonable 
to interpret the statute to authorize 
revocation based on a misdemeanor drug conviction.  Id. at 75-76. 
Likewise, here there is nothing unreasonable 
about the DEA's interpretation of the statute as authorizing revocation 
based on Humphreys' allegedly unlawful 
and irregular prescription of controlled substances in the names of 
individuals other than his patient, Larson.  As 
discussed below, however, the DEA's application of the statute to the 
precise situation facing Humphreys is so 
deficient as to be an abuse of discretion. 
The Privacy Defense 
     In a combined discussion of factors two and four under 21 U.S.C. § 
823(f), the two factors upon which 
the Deputy Administrator relied most heavily, the Deputy Administrator 
emphasized that Humphreys had engaged 
in a course of conduct during approximately a 12-year period that clearly 
violated federal drug prescribing 
regulations.  Specifically, the Deputy Administrator concluded that 
Humphreys' conduct violated 21 C.F.R. § 
1306.04(a), which provides that a prescription for a controlled substance 
"must be issued for a legitimate medical 
purpose by an individual practitioner acting in the usual course of his 
professional practice."  The Deputy 
Administrator concluded that these factors weighed in favor of revoking 
Humphreys' registration, as Humphreys' 
long practice of issuing prescriptions in the names of individuals unknown 
to him and not under his care would not 
meet this criterion.    
     The central deficiency in the Deputy Administrator's decision is his 
complete failure to discuss the one 
and only defense raised by Humphreys:  that prescribing antidepressants 
and other such drugs for a famous patient 
in the name of another individual in order to preserve the privacy of the 
patient was, in fact, the "usual course" of 
medical practice in circumstances such as these and that, therefore, 
Humphreys did not violate the federal 
regulation.  Humphreys squarely and intelligibly raised this defense 
before the Deputy Administrator, as before 
us.  
     Specifically, Humphreys, too ill to appear in person, wrote in a 
letter responding to the DEA Order to 
Show Cause that "[t]he psychiatrist and the neurologist at the trial for 
Justice Larson testified that they probably 
would have done the same thing and might have even used the same 
medications.  They indicated that it is 
common practice, especially in psychiatric patients, to do this."  
Additionally, Humphreys' attorney wrote the 
following: 
          Separate and apart from Dr. Humphrey's [sic] opinion is the 
sworn testimony of Gerald 
          Sandson, M.D. given in the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 
v. Rolf Larson at 
          #9313844, in which this psychiatrist completely concurred with 
the need for privacy in 
          the treatment of Justice Larson. . . .  Testimony at trial 
showed that psychiatric patients 
          suffer a stigma in society, and that public figures bear even 
greater burden. 
           
          During the case of Commonwealth of Pennsylvania vs. [sic] 
Larson, it was established 
          without contradiction, that on a daily basis, psychiatrists on 
the staffs of at least 
          Allegheny General Hospital and the Western Psychiatric Institute 
prescribed drugs in 
          names of people for whom the prescriptions were not intended 
because privacy was an 
          essential part of the treatment of the patient.  No prosecutions 
were ever brought for 
          any of these doctors or hospitals. 
 
Humphreys' attorney also asserted that the sworn testimony at the Larson 
trial also established that privacy was an 
essential part of Larson's treatment, that privacy was the reason the 
drugs were prescribed in the names of others, 
and that the manner and method of Larson's treatment were not inconsistent 
with generally accepted medical 
standards.   
     The Deputy Administrator apparently failed to consider any of this 
evidence, stating instead only that "the 
trial transcript from Justice Larson's trial was not a part of the 
investigative record, and the Respondent did not 
attach a copy of the referenced sections to his Reply."  It is true that 
Humphreys failed to include the Larson trial 
transcripts he cited in the DEA record.  Humphreys should have submitted 
these transcripts to the DEA for 
inclusion in the record.  However, while the record did not contain these 
trial transcripts, the Deputy 
Administrator was clearly aware of the trial and referred specifically to 
Humphreys' testimony at a pre-trial 
hearing in the Larson case.   
Thus, the Deputy Administrator did have before him, and took notice of, 
Humphreys' sworn testimony, observing 
that 
          beginning in 1981 and continuing until 1993, [Humphreys] had 
issued prescriptions for 
          Schedule IV controlled substances intended for Justice Larson's 
use, but he had issued 
          the prescriptions in the name of third-parties. . . .  
[Humphreys] had never met these 
          individuals, and they were not his patients. . . .  [Humphreys] 
testified that he 
          examined Justice Larson about every six months, but not 
necessarily prior to issuing 
          each of the prescriptions.  Rather, Justice Larson would 
telephone [Humphreys] and tell 
          him what substances he wanted and in whose name to issue the 
prescription. . . .  
          [Humphreys] was aware of Justice Larson's diagnosed condition . 
. . and that it was 
          [his] belief that every medication he prescribed for Justice 
Larson was for a legitimate 
          medical purpose.  [Humphreys] testified that he had prescribed 
the substances in 
          legitimate medical dosage amounts and at appropriate time 
intervals.  He states that he 
          prescribed these controlled substances in this manner in order 
to preserve his patient's 
          privacy . . . . 
 
Indeed, nearly the entirety of the administrative record consists of items 
from Larson's criminal trial, including 
hearing transcripts and a copy of the complaint, and newspaper reports 
regarding the trial. 
     We are troubled by the fact that the Deputy Administrator went 
outside the papers submitted by 
Humphreys for evidence supporting his decision, such as Humphreys' pre-
trial testimony – evidence that actually 
indicated that Humphreys acted out of concern for Larson's privacy - yet 
failed to obtain the public trial 
transcripts of Dr. Sandson and others from the very same trial, which were 
cited by Humphreys in his support, or 
to otherwise consider Humphreys' privacy defense. Such failure is 
especially egregious where, as here, the record 
is devoid of any evidence, in the form of affidavits, medical treatises or 
anything else, that would support a 
conclusion that doctors do not prescribe drugs in the name of proxies for 
famous patients with mental disorders in 
the "usual course" of their medical practice.  Nor have we been able to 
locate any previous published DEA or 
court decision in which such privacy concerns were raised and rejected.  
Indeed, at oral argument the DEA 
representative acknowledged that she was unaware of any other proceeding 
in which such a privacy defense had 
been raised. 
     An agency's action is arbitrary and capricious if the agency 
"entirely failed to consider an important 
aspect of the problem, offered an explanation for its decision that runs 
counter to the evidence before the agency, 
or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in view 
or the product of agency expertise."  
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. United States Envtl. Protection 
Agency, 790 F.2d 289, 297-98 (3rd 
Cir. 1986)(quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n. v. State Farm Mutual, 463 
U.S. 29, 43 (1983)) (emphasis added), 
cert. denied sub nom. Chicago Ass'n. of Commerce & Indus. v. National 
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 479 
U.S. 1084 (1987); see also Shane Meat Co. v. United States Dep't of 
Defense, 800 F.2d 334, 336 (3d Cir. 1986) 
("Failure of the agency to address an important aspect of the issue under 
consideration may be fatal to its 
conclusion."). Here, the decision of the Deputy Administrator, lacking any  
analysis of Humphreys' privacy defense, is arbitrary and capricious. 
     In short, the Deputy Administrator both failed to evaluate and 
address Humphreys' defense and to resolve 
the conflict created by the arguments and evidence before him.  See Kent 
v. Schweiker, 710 F.2d 110, 114 (3d 
Cir. 1983) (stating, in reference to the substantial evidence test, that 
"[a] single piece of evidence will not satisfy 
the substantiality test if the Secretary ignores, or fails to resolve, a 
conflict created by countervailing evidence."). 
Humphreys and other trial witnesses asserted that such prescribing 
occurred in the "usual course," and there is no 
contrary evidence in the record.  Thus, there is a conflict between the 
record evidence and the Deputy 
Administrator's tacit assumption about the "usual course" of medical 
practice.  The Deputy Administrator 
nevertheless failed to resolve or even acknowledge this conflict.  He 
neither gave any reasons for rejecting 
Humphreys' assertions about the "usual course," nor cited any evidence 
supporting the conclusion that Humphreys 
did not act in the "usual course."  That he avoided this conflict is all 
the worse given his failure to review the 
public testimony that Humphreys and his attorney specifically cited, 
summarized and asserted would corroborate 
Humphreys' position. 
     It may well be that the testimony referred to by Humphreys and his 
attorney does not, in fact, establish 
that Humphreys was merely engaging in the "usual course" of practice. 
Here, however, the Deputy Administrator 
improperly failed to consider Humphreys' privacy concerns and failed to 
determine whether Humphreys' privacy 
concerns brought his otherwise allegedly improper prescribing conduct 
within the "usual course."  Failing to 
analyze the privacy defense was an abuse of discretion.  Absent such 
analysis, it was arbitrary and capricious to 
revoke Humphreys' registration in reliance on the second and fourth 
factors of 21 U.S.C. § 823(f). 
         We neither disregard nor minimize the substantial deference to 
which such agency decisions are always 
entitled.  See Pennsylvania Funeral Directors Ass'n. v. Federal Trade 
Comm'n., 41 F.3d 81, 85 (3d Cir. 1994) 
("The arbitrary and capricious standard is very deferential.").  We also 
recognize that we must not simply 
substitute our judgment for that of the agency.  Shane Meat Co., 800 F.2d 
at 336.  However, this is not simply a 
case where we disagree with the Deputy Administrator's application of 
relevant mitigating aspects of the statutory 
factors to settled facts.  See Id. (reversing district court decision 
finding an administrative decision arbitrary and 
capricious where the agency decision gave consideration to the relevant 
mitigating factors). Rather, here the 
agency improperly failed even to consider the defense put forth by 
Humphreys.  The case must be remanded for 
proper consideration of that defense.  
Proceedings on Remand 
         In addition to the Deputy Administrator's improper reliance on 
factors two and four in the absence of a 
consideration of Humphreys' privacy defense, the Deputy Administrator's 
remaining discussion of the 21 U.S.C. 
§ 823(f) factors contains several additional inconsistencies and problems 
which should be addressed and corrected 
on remand.   
         First, as to factor one, the "recommendation" of the appropriate 
state licensing board or professional 
disciplinary authority, section 823(f)(1), the Deputy Administrator noted 
that the Pennsylvania Bureau of 
Professional and Occupational Affairs had issued a Show Cause order 
alleging that Humphreys had engaged in a 
12-year pattern of issuing prescriptions to individuals who were not his 
patients that, if proven, would violate state 
law and might justify revoking his medical license.  At the time of DEA's 
decision, however, the only evidence in 
the record pertaining to the state investigation indicated merely that the 
Show Cause order had issued and that 
Pennsylvania bore the burden of proving the charges by a preponderance of 
the evidence.  We have no indication 
whether Humphreys advanced the same defense there as here or what ruling, 
if any, Pennsylvania made on any 
such defense.  On remand, the DEA should determine whether Pennsylvania, 
in fact, met its burden and what 
actions, if any, have actually been taken against Humphreys.  If none, 
then the Deputy Administrator should 
consider whether, by merely issuing the Order to Show Cause, Pennsylvania 
authorities have made any 
"recommendation" within the meaning of section 823(f)(1).  Only if the 
Deputy Administrator properly concludes 
Pennsylvania has made a "recommendation" of revocation or other punitive 
action may any weight adverse to 
Humphreys be given under factor one.  Although in this decision the Deputy 
Administrator only gave limited 
weight to factor one, it is not clear any weight at all is appropriate. 
         Second, we note that, as applied by the Deputy Administrator, any 
weight under factor two, which 
concerns "experience with dispensing . . . controlled substances," is 
entirely dependent on the violation of a 
federal regulation found by the Deputy Administrator under factor four.  
That is, if Humphreys violated the 
federal regulation, that he did so for over 12 years is an aggravating 
factor.  However, if his conduct was indeed 
in the "usual course," its duration is irrelevant. 
         Third, the DEA found that Humphreys' "prescribing of controlled 
substances to Justice Larson merely 
upon his request, without seeing him, examining him, or otherwise making a 
medical evaluation prior to issuing 
the prescription, demonstrated behavior such that the patient's demands 
seemed to replace the physician's 
judgment. . . .  Such uncontroverted actions on the part of the Respondent 
are preponderating evidence that he 
has dispensed controlled substances in violation of federal law."  We have 
reviewed the administrative record and 
see nothing in the current record that would support this particular 
finding. While there is some evidence 
indicating Larson would call Humphreys and request prescriptions for 
certain drugs or request a change in his 
prescription, there is absolutely no testimony indicating Humphreys failed 
to exercise his own medical judgment 
when prescribing medication for Larson. We do not mean to say that the DEA 
might not be able to prove this fact 
at a later date upon an expanded record – only that it has not done so on 
this record. Indeed, if anything, the 
current record indicates Humphreys, in fact, was exercising independent 
medical judgment. Specifically, 
Humphreys stated that he would have adjusted the drugs accordingly had he 
become aware that other drugs were 
being prescribed to Larson by other doctors.  Humphreys also testified  
that it was his belief that every medication he prescribed for Larson was 
medically appropriate.  In addition, the 
testimony of Larson himself indicates Humphreys exercised his own 
judgment.  Specifically, Larson testified 
Humphreys performed a full physical evaluation before prescribing drugs 
for the first time, that the drugs were 
later changed due to side effects, and that Humphreys was the "ultimate 
decider" of what particular drugs to 
prescribe.  Thus, it remains unclear how factor four can weigh against 
Humphreys in this regard.  
         Fourth, the Deputy Administrator found, under factor five, that 
the public was at risk from the potential 
diversion of controlled substances by both Larson, who could have received 
duplicative prescriptions for 
controlled substances, and the employees named on the prescriptions, who 
were prescribed medication they did 
not intend to ingest and for which they themselves lacked a medical need.  
The Deputy Administrator's inferences 
of a threat of public harm are overly broad and only weakly, if at all, 
supported by the present record. Indeed, the 
Deputy Administrator admitted that no such diversion in fact occurred.  
The conclusion that substantial risk for 
diversion existed because Larson or the secretaries and the law clerk 
might resell the drugs, under these 
circumstances, is so unlikely as to be unsustainable.  The secretaries and 
law clerk in whose names the 
prescriptions were written were, after all, trusted employees and 
responsible adults.  They obtained the drugs at 
Larson's specific requests and under his instruction.  Moreover, Larson 
was aware of what drugs he should 
receive from each of these individuals and when he should receive them, 
having contacted Humphreys each time 
to tell Humphreys which name to use for a particular prescription.  Any 
deviation would have been quickly 
noticed and, presumably, dealt with appropriately.  That such trusted 
employees were at risk because they might 
take the drugs themselves or endangered others because they might attempt 
to resell them, rather than turn them 
over to Larson, is "implausible".  See Natural Resources Defense Council, 
790 F.2d at 297-98. 
         It is true, as the Deputy Administrator noted, that the 
pharmacist filling a prescription could not have 
checked any available computer data bank for conflicting prescriptions for 
Larson, since the prescriptions for 
Larson were not in his name. However, the DEA did not establish that the 
pharmacy or pharmacies patronized by 
Larson had such a system in place during the relevant time period.  
Moreover, if Larson frequented more than 
one pharmacy, the DEA has not shown that problems would have been detected 
even if all of Larson's 
prescriptions had been written in his own name. 
         Our discussion of the need on remand to correct the deficiencies 
in the decision under review should not 
be construed in any way as suggesting that Humphreys either is or is not 
entitled to retain his DEA registration.  
We intimate  no view on that issue.  Rather, we hold only that the Deputy 
Administrator failed to properly 
analyze the evidence and decide the issues and must do so on remand. 
                           Conclusion 
         Because the DEA utterly failed to consider Humphreys' defense and 
improperly analyzed some of the 
evidence, its analysis was so inadequate and prejudicial to Humphreys as 
to constitute an abuse of discretion and 
render the revocation order an arbitrary and capricious agency action.  
Therefore, we vacate and remand. 
